Skepticism: political not metaphysical (with apologies to Mr. Rawls) II

Skeptical politics as a style of politics is more often than not defined by what it rejects. As I noted before, it is first and foremost skeptical of ideological politics. In addition to that, it is suspicious of the concentration or centralization of power. This is the case for several reasons. First, humans can’t be trusted in these situations. Acton’s old bromide about the corrupting nature of power is appropriate to both religious and epistemological skeptics. Second, concentrating power in the hands of the few tempts those in power to impose their limited conceptions of the good life on all. There is a false assertion of certainty on the part of the rulers which, even in its benign form, manifests itself in oxymoronic programs like mandatory charitable giving and affirmative action/discrimination programs. This suspicion of concentrated power on the part of political skeptics generally leads them to be suspicious of big government (and big business, as well). Oakeshott noted that, ‘like garlic in cooking, government should be so discreetly used that only its absence is noticed.’ This disposition also manifests itself as a rejection of what Hayek (and Oakeshott) called teleocratic politics in any of its forms (e.g. the productivist, the distributist, the tutelary, or the therapeutic state).

Second, a skeptical politics would also likely be wary of the supposedly benign characteristics of mass participation. Democracy might be a reasonable way to think about the legitimacy or authority of governments, but it involves no substantive results (i.e. it bakes not bread). In fact, democracy is more often than not understood these days in purely abstract terms, and, as such, it is as much of an ideological problem as socialism, liberalism, fascism, etc. Further, according to the political skeptic, there is absolutely no reason to think that people are good, pure, etc. As Hume writes, 'it is…a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact…Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries.' Further, if, as those like Gadamer and Wittgenstein claim, knowledge is related to immersion in practices, then the masses will inevitably not know much about political life (though this doesn’t mean that they know nothing). Inexperience, unfortunately, is the lot of most human beings in most of the affairs of the world, and there is no reason to believe that consulting the opinions of the hoi polloi will produce anything other than incompetence.

Third, a skeptical politics would doubt that political activity is either necessary for the achievement of the good life or that it is the central activity in the creation and sustenance of a community. Like Augustine, the political skeptic views order as the chief good that politics can achieve, and believes that it is both vain and dangerous to expect political activity to accomplish our salvation or to even create a virtuous civil body. As Oakeshott the poet once wrote,
Those who in fields Elysian would dwell
Do but extend the boundaries of hell.
Individuals and groups have their own distinctive interests and practices and it is these practices which constitute a community’s mores as much if not more than political activity. Thus, politics should be concerned primarily with managing a given state of affairs in a way that accords with the customs and traditions of that specific political community. To use Halifax’s old metaphor, the job of the government is to keep the boat afloat in whatever waters it happens to be sailing.

These very general notions do not, however, prescribe particular political policies. Indeed, the political skeptic claims that there is no such thing as a foolproof method of doing so, whether it be advertised as a categorical imperative or a set of hierarchical principles of justice or a doctrine of scientific/historical materialism. Skeptical politics instead might serve as a prophylactic against those irrelevant and insidious forms of political discourse which justify attempts to do the impossible (e.g. Marcuse’s formulation of ‘an historical calculus’ by which we could demonstrate whether a revolution was on the side of ‘progress or reaction’; or, as Kedourie describes the typical Keynesian conception of administrative control, ‘like virtuoso organists, the minister…and his learned and expert calculists, pressing these keys, pulling those stops, and depressing those other pedals produce a happy economy and a harmonious body politic’).

Depending upon one’s own disposition and the traditions of one’s political community, a skeptical politics could endorse a wide range of activities (from national health care to complete privatization; from an aggressive assertion of national self-interest to Swiss-style isolation; from a high-powered market economy to a localist, small-producer-based economy, etc.). However, the reasons offered in justification of any of these institutions and activities would be limited by the inherent skepticism of ideological justifications (i.e. an appeal to defending a ‘free’ market is no more an argument in reference to the regulation of the financial system than an appeal to the defense of human rights or making the world safe for democracy is with reference to military intervention), and thus our politics would be more honest, less violently emotional, and less visible.

Tomorrow I think I’ll write a short bit on political skepticism and the American political tradition.